Introduction
By using my eyes, I can come to know that there is a hawk perching on the fence post.
Cognitive science has made enormous progress in understanding how we have this sort of perceptual knowledge. Any textbook on perception will go into detail about the receptors in the eye, the detection of low-level features such as edges, the recovery of 3D shape, and theories of object recognition. Much is controversial, and much is unknown, but the broad shape of a satisfying account, together with some of the intricate small parts, is clear enough.
When I am in a position to know, by using my eyes, that there is a hawk on the fence post, I am usually in a position to know something else, namely that I see a hawk.
This second item of knowledge is of course not entailed by the first: idealism aside, the hawk has no essential connection to me or my perceptual state. Equally obviously, this second item of knowledge is not evidentially probable given the first: the mere fact that there is a hawk on the fence post is hardly good evidence that it is seen, let alone that I am the one who sees it. Which is to say that an account of how I know that there is a that tells you that, unlike a zombie, you experience it? What is it that you are aware of that indicates that you are aware of it? (2003, 1, note omitted) Dretske's point-applied to our running example-was alluded to in this chapter's second paragraph. The hawk has no special connection to visual experience-provided it does not notice my presence, the bird does not "indicate that I am aware of it." Hawks can and frequently do happily perch unseen on fence posts; put more generally, the world as revealed by vision does not have vision in it. Thus, the presence of the hawk does not favor the hypothesis that I see it over the "skeptical hypothesis" that I am a (Dretskean) zombie, and hence do not see it. The evidence (facts) provided by vision would be exactly the same even if I were a zombie. 5 One (vaguely stated) answer to our question is that I know that I see a hawk merely by attending to the scene before my eyes, and in particular to the hawk. Dretske was formerly sympathetic to this idea; with a nod to the epigraph from Ryle, call it the transparency proposal. 6 Despite the proposal's attractions (of which more shortly), the 5 Cf. Wittgenstein [1921] 2001, Tractatus 5.633, "nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye" (referred to in Dretske's opening paragraph). Wittgenstein's concern is the self (in fact the "metaphysical subject"), not vision. And the self is another problem: the world as revealed by vision also does not have me in it. (The fact that I can usually see my nose is not the key to this difficulty.) The point is somewhat obscured by concentrating on a Dretskean zombie scenario, which does have me in it (or at any rate a Dretskean zombie who resembles me). Likewise, a video taken by a camera does not (usually) have the camera in it. Of course, one could work out the location and motion of the camera from a video containing enough perspectival information (cf. Gibson 1979, ch. 7) , but the information the camera records about the scene does not itself imply that it was recorded. Although the emphasis will be on vision, the problem about the self will also be addressed in what follows, albeit inexplicitly.
6 For Dretske's earlier view, see Dretske 1995, ch. 2 . The now numerous discussions of "transparency" in the literature are of course not sourced to Ryle [1949] 1963, but to Moore 1903. considerations just rehearsed seem decisively to refute it. For the facts revealed by attending to the scene before my eyes are at best very weak evidence that I see a hawk.
Call this the evidential objection to the transparency proposal.
This chapter will elaborate and defend the transparency proposal. Let us begin by confirming that the evidential objection has no quick solution.
Supplementary Environmental Evidence
According to the transparency proposal, I know that I see a hawk merely by attending to the hawk. And the evidential objection is that the evidence about the hawk gathered by this procedure is not good evidence that I see it. Notice, though, that vision also gives me information concerning the spatial relation between the hawk and myself, namely that I am facing the hawk. Dretske in effect considers the revision and dismisses it in a few sentences:
"Zombies, after all, have bodies too. A zombie's arms and legs, just like ours, occupy positions. Their muscles get fatigued " (2003, 2) . In the skeptical scenario, the zombie's body also faces the hawk, the zombie's eyes are open, etc. This additional evidence does not discriminate, then, between the scenario in which I see a hawk and the scenario in which I am a (Dretskean) zombie.
But even by Dretske's lights this is too quick. His question is: "What is it about this world [of "objective, mind-independent objects"] that tells you that, unlike a zombie, you experience it?" And his dismissal of the present proposal gives the impression that an answer needs to be absolutely skeptic-proof, displaying a body of evidence gained through perception that entails that I see a hawk. In fact, Dretske is not setting the bar so high: the challenge he poses is to explain how I know that I see a hawk by observing the environment (including, perhaps, my body). And the suggestion about proprioception and my relation to the hawk is, in effect, the idea that I find out that I see a hawk on the basis of the sort of evidence that would support the claim that someone else sees a hawk. I can come to know that someone else sees a hawk by noting that there is a suitably placed and salient hawk, that the person's eyes are open and converge on the hawk, and the like. 8 Or so we may assume-skepticism about other minds is not the issue. Hence, the problem with the present suggestion is not that it fails to supply a way of knowing that I see a hawk, and so that I am not a zombie.
The problem, rather, is that I plainly do not rely on supplementary proprioceptive evidence in order to know that I see a hawk. Suppose that unbeknownst to me, I am suddenly stuck by a bizarre medical condition that renders my eyelids transparent. I turn to face the hawk and close my eyes. I know these latter two facts. Since I know that my eyes are closed, on the present suggestion I lack sufficient evidence to know that I see a hawk. But if Ryle asks me "Do you see a hawk?" I would hardly claim that I do not, or that the question was a difficult one to answer! I know that I see a hawk, just as I do in the normal case. 
Evans on Knowledge of Perceptual Experiences
The evidential objection would be of little interest if the transparency proposal lacked plausibility anyway. However, there is much to be said in its favor. As Ryle puts it, my seeing of the hawk "seems to be a queerly transparent sort of process." 10 There is the hawk, sitting on the fence post. There is Gilbert Ryle, out for a stroll, pausing to descry the hawk. Here am I, looking at Ryle and the hawk. To me, Ryle's seeing of the hawk is a perceptually manifest fact, as is the fact that the hawk is on the fence post. My own seeing of the hawk, on the other hand, is quite a different matter. I see Ryle and note that his gaze is hawkwards; I do not see myself, or my eyes. Moreover, it does not ring true to say that I discover that I see the hawk by some special introspective sense. There is no switch in attention-say to myself or to a "visual experience"-when Ryle asks me "Do
The point can be reinforced by considering other modalities, which one would expect to have the same basic epistemology as vision. Suppose I hear the distinctive scream of a red-tailed hawk and cannot identify the direction of the sound. I can know that I hear the scream (or the hawk) without checking that my ears are not blocked, or gathering further evidence about the location of the hawk and the orientation of my ears. 10 Unfortunately, Ryle then goes on to claim that "the mystery dissolves when we realize that 'see', 'descry', and 'find' are not process words, experience words, or activity words. . . . The reason why I cannot catch myself seeing . . . is that [this verb is] of the wrong type to complete the phrase 'catch myself . . . ' ([1949] 1963, 285) . Since the mystery can be stated without falsely assuming that 'see' is a "task verb" (Ryle's phrase) like 'run' and 'aim', Ryle's proposed solvent does not work. you see the hawk?" I answer by attending to the hawk. (Indeed, if I attend to something else, I might well give the wrong answer.
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The transparency proposal can be extracted from Evans's influential but brief discussion of the "self-ascription of perceptual experiences" (1982, 226) :
[A] subject can gain knowledge of his internal informational states [his "perceptual experiences"] in a very simple way: by re-using precisely those skills of conceptualization that he uses to make judgements about the world. Here is how he can do it. He goes through exactly the same procedure as he would go through if he were trying to make a judgement about how it is at this place now he may prefix this result with the operator 'It seems to me as though . . . ' (ibid.,
227-228)
Here Evans is concerned with knowledge of how things perceptually appear. But the point is evidently supposed to apply to knowledge of what one sees. The subject-Evans might have added-may, after looking at the scene before his eyes, prefix a phrase encapsulating the result ('a hawk') with 'I see'.
Although the quotation has the subject attaching a sentential operator to a sentence, presumably Evans did not mean to tie knowledge of one's perceptual states to language. Recast in nonlinguistic terms and restricted to the case of seeing an object, the procedure suggested by the quotation is that one can come to know that one sees an object by an inference whose sole premise concerns one's (typically non-mental) environment, "how it is at this place now," as Evans puts it. (In fact, this is not Evans's view. This will become clear later, in section 8, when the elision in the quoted passage from Evans is filled in.)
If we remain similarly coy for the moment about the exact nature of the premise, this inference can be set out as follows:
P: It is thus-and-so at this place now C: I see a hawk
With this more explicit statement of the transparency proposal in hand, Dretske's evidential objection can be put as follows: this inference is not knowledge-conducive because P is not good evidence for C.
Epistemic Rules
For the discussion to come, some terminology will be useful. Let us say that an epistemic rule is a conditional of the form, 'If conditions C obtain, believe that p', for example:
WOODPECKER: If x is a bird with a red head, believe that x is a woodpecker.
And let us stipulate, not unnaturally, that one follows this rule on a particular occasion iff one believes that x is a woodpecker because one recognizes that x is a red-headed bird, where the 'because' marks the kind of reason-giving causal connection that is discussed under the rubric of 'the basing relation '. 12 12 In the terminology of Byrne 2005, 94 , because of the presence of the schematic letter 'x', WOODPECKER is a schematic rule; one follows a schematic rule iff one follows an instance of it.
In general, then, S follows the rule 'If conditions C obtain, believe that p' on a particular occasion iff on that occasion:
(1) S believes that p because she recognizes that conditions C obtain; which implies:
(2) S recognizes (hence knows) that conditions C obtain; (3) conditions C obtain; (4) S believes that p.
Following WOODPECKER (in certain circumstances that can be left uninvestigated)
tends to produce knowledge, and hence is a good rule. Following DODO, 'If x is a quacking bird, believe that x is a dodo', produces beliefs that are not knowledge, and hence is a bad rule.
The Evans-inspired transparency proposal and Dretske's evidential objection can be put in terms of this apparatus of epistemic rules. On the transparency proposal, I come to know that I see a hawk by following this rule:
HAWK: If it is thus-and-so at this place now, believe that you see a hawk.
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And Dretske's evidential objection is that if 'it is thus-and-so' is spelled out as intended, as concerning the hawk before my eyes, the rule must be a bad one, because the antecedent is very poor evidence that I see a hawk. silenced. But does following HAWK lead to nonaccidentally true beliefs? To answer that question the template 'thus-and-so at this place now' needs to be filled in. And as soon as we try to do that, another-potentially more serious-objection is apparent.
The Amodal Problem
A first thought is to fill in the 'thus-and-so' along these lines:
HAWK †: If there is a hawk over there, believe that you see a hawk.
On second thought, HAWK † is not a good rule, even waiving Dretske's evidential objection. Suppose I follow HAWK †, and so know that there is a hawk there. Since there are numerous ways of knowing that there is a hawk there that do not involve currently perceiving the hawk, let alone seeing it, the probability that I see a hawk, given that I know that there is a hawk there, is low. To conclude that I see a hawk is to take a stab in the dark.
Suppose we try inserting the subject into the antecedent:
HAWK †: If there is a hawk right in front of you, believe that you see a hawk.
This sort of maneuver certainly helps increase the probability that I see a hawk, conditional on my knowing the antecedent. But again, there are many other nonvisual ways in which I might know the antecedent. If following a rule like HAWK † were my chief strategy for finding out that I see a hawk, then I would be prone to all sorts of errors that I actually never make.
The apparent root of the difficulty is that information does not wear its provenance from a particular sensory modality on its face-information is amodal.
Perhaps the idea that one knows what one believes and knows by directing attention "outward-on the world" (Evans 1982, 225) has something going for it. But the amodal nature of information, it might be thought, shows that perception is where this idea irretrievably runs into sand.
What are the alternatives?
Alternatives to Transparency
According to the transparency proposal, I know that I see a hawk by an inference from a single premise about the hawk-infested landscape beyond. There two main alternative options.
Option 1 is that no premise about my environment is needed: I know that I see a hawk without appealing to evidence concerning the scene before my eyes-I know nonobservationally that I see a hawk. ('Observation' is meant to cover only observation of the normal visual sort; on option 1, perhaps I know that I see a hawk by introspection, conceived of as a kind of inner perception.) Option 2 is that although a premise about my environment is needed, it is not enough: additional mental evidence is required. Let us take these in turn.
6.1. Option 1: Non-Observational Knowledge Option 1, that I know non-observationally that I see a hawk, requires immediate amendment. First, note that this does not apply to every case of knowing that I see a hawk, because sometimes an environmental premise is plainly needed: I know that I see that bird (pointing to a hawk perching atop a distant tall tree), but I am not in a position to know that I see a hawk. Ryle is passing by and informs me that the bird is a hawk; with this environmental premise in hand, I conclude that I see a hawk. Second, extending this first point, perhaps one can never know non-observationally that one sees a hawk-all such knowledge is based on evidence that one sees such-and-such, and that such-andsuch is a hawk, with the latter item of evidence being known observationally. So a more careful and general statement of option 1 is as follows: knowledge that one sees an F/this F is either non-observational, or else based on evidence that includes the fact that one sees a G/this G, known non-observationally.
If there is any non-observational knowledge of this sort, knowledge that one sees this red spot (pointing to a clearly visible red spot) is an example, or so we may suppose.
Since the fact that one sees this red spot entails that this spot is red, one may come to know that this spot is red by inference from the fact that one sees this red spot. Now one may also know that this spot is red simply by looking at it-an animal with no conception of seeing could use its eyes to know that this spot is red. So no knowledge that one sees this red spot is necessary. Thus, on this view, there are two routes to the same conclusion:
one may know that the spot is red twice over, by inference from a non-observationally known fact about what one sees, and by the more familiar method of simply using one's eyes.
This result is more than strange. First, note that one may see what is, in fact, a red spot, even though the spot does not look red (perhaps one is viewing the spot in very dim light). One is not able to tell by looking that this spot is red, but one might have various backup routes to that conclusion-perhaps one painted the spot oneself from a can of red paint. However, the alleged non-observational backup route is clearly inoperative:
although it is true that one sees this red spot, no amount of introspection will reveal this fact. The obvious explanation is that in cases where the spot is clearly visible, the information one obtains by vision about the spot is somehow used to derive the conclusion that one sees this red spot, but if that is right then option 1 must be rejected.
Second, note that when one sees a red spot and believes both that this spot is red and that one sees this red spot, it is not a possibility that two spots are in play. Could this red spot be a different spot from this red spot that one sees? That is not a serious question, but if one knew non-observationally that one sees this red spot it apparently would be. Return to the situation in which one views this red spot in dim light. Suppose one remembers that one painted this spot red; on occasion, one might reasonably wonder whether one's memory was quite accurate-perhaps one painted another spot red, not this very spot. As before: the obvious explanation of why the identity of the spot is never in question is to say that the information about this spot is used to derive the conclusion that one sees it.
Finally, if I know non-observationally that I see this red spot, then certain dissociations are to be expected. In particular, one's vision and reasoning capacities might be working perfectly normally, while the mechanism that yields non-observational knowledge that one sees this red spot is broken or absent. One's only means of finding out that one sees a red spot would then be similar to third-person cases: one knows that one sees a red spot because one knows that there is a red spot right there, that the light is good, that one's eyes are open, and so forth. Often one knows through vision about an object's location and other features, but is unsure whether someone else sees it (perhaps one does not know that the person's gaze is in the right direction). Similarly, someone who only had third-person access to her states of seeing would sometimes be in a state of uncertainty about whether she saw an object, while quite certain (via her excellent vision) about the nature of the object itself. It is safe to say that this bizarre condition never occurs. 16 Pending some explanation of why the non-observational mechanism never fails in this way, this is a reason for thinking that option 1 is incorrect.
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16 As Ned Block pointed out to me, the closest approximation in the literature appears to be the case of "reverse Anton's syndrome" described by Hartmann et al. (1991; see also Block 1997, 159) . The patient was initially diagnosed as blind due to a stroke. Two years later he was found to have spared vision in a 30º wedge in both fields. Anton's syndrome patients deny that they are blind; this patient denied that he could see. At one point he remarked that "you (the examiners) told me that I can see it, so I must be able to see it" (Hartmann et al. 1991, 33 ).
However, the patient's vision was far from excellent. He could read words, but with limited accuracy (51% correct on a standard test). Strikingly, he was "unable to discriminate light from dark" (37). The patient's cognition was also impaired, with mild language and memory deficits. Further, sometimes he used perceptual verbs in describing his condition: on a color-naming task, "he maintained that he could "feel" or "hear" the color" (34). The correct description of the patient's predicament is unobvious. As Hilbert notes, "a certain amount of scepticism about the case is in order" (1994, 449) . And, as Hartmann et al. say, reverse Anton's syndrome is not clearly documented in any other published case. 17 The bizarre condition is what Shoemaker (1994) calls "self-blindness" with respect to seeing. It is worth emphasizing that someone who is self-blind with respect to vision is not the "super-duper blindsighter" of Block, who has "blindsight that is every bit as good, functionally speaking, as [normal] sight" (1997, 409) . There are two differences. The first is that Block's super-duper-blindsighter denies that he sees anything, whereas the selfblind person knows by third-person means that she sees things. This first difference probably just reflects unimportant differences of detail between these two science-fiction stories; Block would not deny that a super-duper-blindsighter could investigate his own states of seeing third-personally.
The second difference is the important one: the super-duper blindsighter has a faculty "that is every bit as good, functionally speaking," as normal vision, except that the resulting perceptual states lack "phenomenal consciousness." The super-duperblindsighter is thus, as Block says, a "quasi-zombie" (1997, 409) , or a "visual-zombie," in something close to the usual sense of 'zombie' (not Dretske's sense: see section 2).
Option 2, First Pass: Visual Sensations
Since option 1 faces some serious objections, let us turn to option 2, that additional evidence is required. And from a more traditional position in the philosophy of perception, the need for such evidence is palpable. Seeing an object is a matter of the object causing distinctive sorts of affectations of the mind, "visual sensations." It is thus natural to think of knowledge that one sees an object as resting on evidence about both ends of this causal transaction-evidence about the object coming from observation, and evidence about the sensation coming from some other source. So, in order to know that I The self-blind person has normal vision, at least in the sense that she sees what we see, and has the sort of perceptual knowledge that we have, but lacks the "peculiar access" (Byrne 2005 ) that we have to our states of seeing. Nothing is being assumed, one way or the other, about whether the self-blind person's visual states have phenomenal consciousness in Block's sense.
Dissociation problems also afflict option 2, but this will not be discussed further. see a hawk on the basis of two items of evidence: the external nonpsychological fact that a hawk is present and the internal psychological fact that a visual sensation is occurring.
(Note that placing a substantive restriction on the type of visual sensation would not be advisable, since almost any kind of visual sensation could accompany seeing a hawk-it could look blue, or cubical, or whatever.) Knowledge that one sees an F, then, is obtained by following this rule: We can pass over attempts to add epicycles to SEE i , because the nettle analogy is fundamentally defective. When I see a hawk I do not have a spectacular kind of migraine headache whose only connection to the hawk is that it is caused by the hawk. This is 18 Another problem is due to the word 'present' in the antecedent. This prevents me from always believing that I see a hawk, since I always believe that there are hawks somewhere. But 'present' excludes too much-in principle, I can see a hawk at any distance (cf. seeing a supernova) and also readily know that I see it.
basically Ryle's point when he observes that in the "unsophisticated use of 'sensation'" a typical case of seeing does not involve any sensations ([1949] 1963, 228 But what is it for a visual experience to be "of" a hawk? An influential discussion of this question is in Searle's 1983 book Intentionality. Searle writes:
I can no more separate this visual experience from the fact that it is an experience of a yellow station wagon that I can separate this belief from the fact that it is a belief that it is raining; the "of" of "experience of" is in short the "of" of Intentionality. (Searle 1983, 39) An experience of a hawk may be said to be "of" a hawk in the same way that a belief about a hawk is "of" a hawk. Experience, then, like belief, has intentionality: my experience of a hawk and the belief that there is a hawk on the fence post are both "of" or "about" a hawk. But the parallel, Searle thinks, is even closer. The belief that there is a hawk on the fence post has propositional content, namely the proposition that there is a hawk on the fence post. And likewise for visual experiences:
The content of the visual experience, like the content of the belief, is always equivalent to a whole proposition. Visual experience is never simply of an object but rather it must always be that such and such is the case. (40) In the case of an experience of a yellow station wagon, "a first step in making the content explicit," Searle says, "would be, for example, I have a visual experience (that there is a yellow station wagon there)" (41).
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On this view, perceptual experiences have content, like belief, desire, and other "propositional attitudes." To a first approximation, one may think of the content of the subject's visual experience as the information (or misinformation) delivered to the subject by his faculty of vision (cf. Armstrong 1968: 224) . When the delivery is one of misinformation, the subject suffers a visual illusion. Although this is somewhat 19 Searle's considered view is that the content is the proposition that "there is a yellow station wagon there and that there is a yellow station wagon there is causing this visual experience" (1983, 48) Even taking the ontology and epistemology of "visual experiences" for granted, there are no easy alternatives to the transparency proposal. So let us revisit it.
Back to Transparency
For the moment, shelve illusions and concentrate on veridical cases, where one sees an object and it is as it looks. Return to the object-dependent suggestion: Recall that a v-fact concerns the sensible qualities of objects in the scene before the eyes. In one way this notion is perfectly familiar. When I see the hawk on the fence post, a segment of the visible world is revealed: an array of colored, textured, three- 23 For a sketchy proposal about the visual representation of hue, see Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 14. 24 The last two sentences should be qualified. First, cross-modal effects show vision does not reveal the visual world unaided-other modalities sometimes help too. Second, the negation takes wide-scope: it is not the case that there are smells or noises in the visual world. The visual world is silent on such matters. Still, SEE takes the sting out of the evidential objection much as KNOW did.
Recall that the latter rule is:
KNOW: If p, believe that you know that p Section 4 noted that KNOW is self-verifying: if one follows it, then one's belief that one knows that p is true. KNOW typically produces reliably true beliefs, and there is no clear barrier to supposing that it also typically produces knowledge. To that extent, the evidential objection is rebutted.
SEE, in contrast, is not self-verifying: perhaps one could in principle learn that [ x ] V by reading it in the-as-yet-unwritten-language of vision; one would not thereby see
x. But it is practically self-verifying: in all ordinary situations, one knows that [ x ] V only if one sees x. As section 4 also noted, self-verification is not sufficient for a rule to be knowledge-conducive; a fortiori, practical self-verification is not either. But the dialectical imperative is not to prove that following SEE yields knowledge; rather it is to reply to the evidential objection. And for that, practical self-verification will do.
The Memory Objection
The claim that SEE is practically self-verifying might be thought to be too strong. Surely, . . Red(x, t 1 ) . . . ] V ', and further suppose that I remember it. Shortly after, at t 2 , a piece of cardboard is placed in front of the spot, completely occluding it; I am quite confident that the spot itself has not changed color: the distinctive visual way the spot was is the way the spot now is. I know (we may assume) that [ . . . Red(x, t 2 ) . . . ] V . Granted all this, I am in a position to follow SEE and conclude that I see a red spot. But obviously I do not.
Why not? Either something blocks in the inference in this case, or I do not follow SEE in any circumstances.
Once this disjunction is conceded, it is hard to avoid the second disjunct.
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However, the memory objection should not be allowed to get started in the first place.
Consider recalling something one has seen-say, recalling the red spot one saw. Such an exercise of one's episodic memory is akin to visual imagery: it is somehow visual in character, but easily distinguished from actually seeing a red spot. In a Humean framework, this is because, in episodic recollection, one is aware of a faded copy (an "idea") of one's past visual "impression" (or sense datum). The similarity is explained by the copying, the difference is explained by the fading. Granting the existence of impressions and ideas, this purported explanation is perhaps the best that can be found.
The Humean attempt at an explanation has a (superior) counterpart in the present information-based framework. In episodically recollecting the spot, one is aware of a segment of the past visual world, but although the information is packaged visually, it is a transformed and degraded version of the visual information that characterizes successful seeing. The similarity is explained by the visual packaging, the difference is explained by the transforming and degrading. where the curly brackets represent the episodic-memory transformation and degradation 25 Could the fact that the cardboard "occludes" the spot block the inference? No. If 'occludes the spot' means 'prevents me from seeing the spot', this just raises the question how I know the cardboard occludes the spot. On the other hand, if it means 'is opaque and in front of the spot' then my knowing this fact does not explain why I do not follow SEE. Suppose I can in fact see the spot, due to some devious arrangement of mirrors, or because I have suddenly gained Superman's ability to see through walls. Despite knowing that the cardboard is opaque and in front of the spot, I would follow SEE and conclude that I see it.
26 For a discussion of this, see Byrne 2011. So far we have concentrated on the veridical case: I see the hawk and it is as it looks. Let us now return to illusions. To give some examples more realistic than the one mentioned at the end of section 6: the hawk looks closer than it really is, or a shadow appears as a patch of darkened green on the field beyond, or the hawk is perching on a wall that generates Richard Gregory's "café wall illusion." 29 In such cases, the fact I seem to 27 Our visual memories are very impressive, at least under some conditions (Brady et al. 2008) . But as far as I know, the evidence supports the transformation and degradation hypothesis. Some examples: Burnham and Clark 1955 (memory for hue), Uchikawa and Ikeda 1986 (memory for brightness). Clearly much more could be said here, though.
28 See Goldenberg, Müllbacher, and Nowak 1995 (blindness denial arguably explained by the patient's spared visual imagery; see also Byrne 2010, 117-118) . A more common example might be this. Suppose one is in bed, in almost total darkness. One opens one's eyes and looks in the direction of a familiar object-a desk, say. One episodically recollects its distinctive visual qualities as they appear from this angle. Does one see the desk? When in this sort of situation myself, I sometimes wonder whether I am merely visually recollecting the object rather than seeing it. 
Evans's Proposal
30 See Byrne 2005, 97. 31 An objection at this point is that one cannot come to know something by inference from a false premise, a moral commonly drawn from Gettier cases. But an arguably better diagnosis of the Gettier cases is that safety (in the sense of Sosa 1999 and Williamson 2000, ch. 5 ) is a necessary condition for knowledge, not that no reasoning through false steps is a necessary condition for knowledge. And beliefs produced by trying to follow SEE will often be safe (cf. Byrne 2005, 96-98) . See also Silins, this volume.
Recall the quotation from section 3, where Evans is explaining how someone may gain knowledge of how things perceptually appear by "re-using precisely those skills of conceptualization that he uses to make judgements about the world." The quoted passage contained an elision, and it is time to restore it. Here are the crucial sentences.
[The subject] goes through exactly the same procedure as he would go through if he were trying to make a judgement about how it is at this place now, but One immediate problem with this suggestion turns on the notion of "knowledge of an extraneous kind." 32 The effect of excluding extraneous knowledge is intended to make me rely exclusively on the testimony of vision, but it cannot be characterized as "facts I
32 More generally, it should be belief, not just knowledge.
know other than by current vision" on pain of circularity. Could an extraneous piece of knowledge be characterized simply as something that I previously knew about the patch?
Then the counterfactual to be verified is 'If I had not known anything about the patch beforehand, I would have judged that [ . . . Reddish(x) . . . ] V '. This suggestion has a number of problems. First, it is quite implausible that a counterfactual of this sort will always be true in every case, or that I will judge that such a counterfactual is true.
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Second, intuitively it gets things back to front. If I do know that the counterfactual is true, then isn't this because I know the patch looks reddish? Finally, in bringing in sophisticated counterfactual judgments about my own mind, the attractive idea that I can know that I see a hawk merely by attending to the hawk has been thrown overboard.
Belief-Independence
The known-illusion problem is entirely generated by the widespread assumption that, as Evans puts it, there is a fundamental (almost defining) property of states of the informational system, 34 which I shall call their 'belief-independence': the subject's being in an informational state is independent of whether or not he believes that the state is veridical. It is a well-known fact about perceptual illusions that it will continue to 33 For example, suppose one has a known-illusion of motion by viewing Kitaoka's "rotating snakes" figure (<http://visiome.neuroinf.jp/modules/xoonips/image.php?file_id=1173>). Assume, with Evans, that one does not believe that anything in the figure is moving. If one had not known anything about the figure beforehand, would one have judged that anything in the figure were moving? That depends. The figure and the motion both look so unusual, that a sensible person might well smell a rat. (Cf. Jackson 1977, 40-41.) 34 Which subserves "perception, communication, and memory" and "constitutes the substratum of our cognitive lives" (1982, 122 Second, perception is clearly belief-like-which is why Armstrong-style attempts to reduce perception to belief were certainly worth trying. Perception compels belief: the visual appearance of unequal lines is accompanied by the belief that the lines are unequal, absent (apparent) evidence to the contrary. And perception has the same "direct of fit" as belief: false beliefs and illusory perceptions are mental states that are both failures, in some (admittedly obscure) sense. Belief-dependence explains both these features.
Compulsion is explained simply because the visual appearance of unequal lines is always accompanied by the belief that the lines are unequal. Sometimes that belief will not be manifest because it is suppressed by the contrary belief that the lines are equal; remove that contrary belief, and one will have an unsuppressed belief that the lines are unequal, that will manifest itself in the usual way. And direction of fit is explained because the failure of a constitutive component of a perceptual state presumably implies the failure (or less than complete success) of the state as a whole.
36 See also Byrne 2009, 450-451 and 2010, 120-121. Finally, consider the really quite remarkable phenomenon that numerous notlong-dead philosophers claimed to believe the deliverances of vision even in cases of illusion. 37 "When I see a tomato," H. H. Price famously declared, "there is much I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection, perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination.
One thing however I cannot doubt; that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth" (Price 1932, 3) . On the orthodox view, the plain man does not believe that there exists a bulgy red patch when he knows that the devious color-illusion has been explained. So why, on the orthodox view, do distinguished philosophers like
Price believe the contrary after careful phenomenological study? Are they insane?
On some accounts of delusions (e.g., the Capgras delusion), they involve beliefs that are "modular" in something like the sense of Fodor 1983: delusory beliefs are largely inferentially isolated and persist despite evidence to the contrary (see, e.g., Jones, Delespaul, and van Os 2003) . Belief-dependence offers a similar model of cases of known illusion. Since one believes the relevant v-proposition in a case of known illusion, one is in a position to (try to) follow SEE. Therefore, the known-illusion problem does not arise.
38 37 More exactly, the deliverances of (roughly) mid-level vision. There are also many longdead examples. 38 If an ideal of rationality is avoidance of inconsistency, then belief-dependence implies that someone who suffers a perceptual illusion thereby falls short of the rational ideal. (As Craig (1976, 15-16 ) points out; see also Glüer 2009, 303 n. 10.) Can this be turned into a convincing objection?
To close, three features of the transparency proposal should be highlighted. First, the transparency proposal is an inferentialist account of knowledge of what one sees; an odd inference, to be sure, but an inference nonetheless. Second, the transparency account is economical: it explains self-knowledge in terms of epistemic capacities and abilities that are needed for knowledge of other subject matters. And third, the account is detectivist:
broadly causal mechanisms play an essential role in the acquisition of knowledge of what one sees, as they do generally in knowledge of contingent matters.
Economy is needed to explain why intelligent subjects with normal vision inevitably know what they see in the usual distinctive first-personal way. 39 Detectivism is just common sense. Inferentialism, on the other hand, runs counter to the usual characterization of self-knowledge as "direct" (that is, not inferential). Does this mean
No. It will not do simply to claim that the illuded subject is not, or need not be, irrational. Taken as a claim about a rational ideal, its truth is not evident. Taken as an ordinary sort of remark, on the other hand, it is true but not in conflict with beliefdependence. The belief that the subject knows to be false (e.g., a certain v-proposition that is true only if the lines are unequal) does not influence her verbal reports about the lengths of the lines, or any plans for action based on the lengths of the lines. She is not therefore 'irrational' in the practical sense of an ordinary accusation of irrationality. The subject's belief that the lines are unequal does little harm-at worst, it would make her a sense datum theorist. Indeed, given the epistemological account of this chapter, it actually does some good, by allowing the illuded subject to know what she sees.
Glüer, who thinks that belief-dependence founders on this sort of consideration, asserts that "there is nothing 'irrational' about the lines looking of different length" (2009, 303 n. 9). But she does not explain why this is true on the required reading of 'irrational'. 39 That is, it is needed to explain why dissociations of the sort mentioned at the end of section 6.1 do not occur.
